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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
STATEI.SNT OF PROBLEM
This study seeks to investigate the problem of God in
}j the philosophy of Josiah Royce and Robert L. Calhoun. It deals
| with their arguments for the existence of God and the resul-
tant views of his character.
An interest in the general problem and a desire for
better understanding led to the choice of Josiah Royce' s work,-
;
The work of Robert L. Calhoun, a contemporary-, provided oppor-
j
tunity for critical comparison and greater insight into the
problem. An examination of their contributions reveals that
Rojoe gives a more thorough and systematic treatment to the
problem and merits a more significant place in the history/ of
i
philosophy. Devotion of rove time and space to his work in
|
this paper indicates recognition of his greater significance.
This Study leads to a consideration of the arguments
for God from the works of these two authors. Tbe difference
in their basic approach to reality gives two viewpoints in tiie
I solution of the problem. Criticisms are made of their argu-
i ments and resultant concepts.
(
.-2-—
HISTORY AMI PRESENT STATUS OF THE PROBLEM
In religious philosophy the problem of God is ever
the central issue. It is represented in another form in the
general field of philosophy as man's eternal search for reali-
ty. The problem is in this sense one of the oldest. Yet
viewing it relative to the thinking of these two men, the
problem of this thesis takes an original form.
Histories of philosophy must include a consideration
of Josiah Royce and his idealistic position. He is America's
foremost representative of Absolute Idealism, his particular
form of one of the most influential schools of thought. His
thinking has contributed much to the Idealism of our present
generation. Several of America's leading philosophers of
today have come under his direct influence
.
( 1 ) He had an ' •
admirable spirit which was satisfied with nothing but the
best. Truth was ever his search. He was the continuous
seeker after God. These several reasons combine to place
Royce among the great philosophers of all times.
The other philosopher, Robert L. Calhoun, still lives
to continue his work. It is yet early to pass on his signifi-
cance in the history of philosophy. However on the basis of
available material, it can be said, for the present, that he
merits a far less significant place.
1. Cf. M. W. Calkins, W. E. Hocking, G. W. Cunning-
ham, and others. An explanation of abbreviations used will
be found in the bibliography.
II
I
SOURCES OF DATA
Sources of data for this paper are indicated by the
limitation given to the problem. ks it deals with the argu-
ments for God and the resultant concepts of God in the phil-
osophy of Royce and Calhoun, the sources used are the several
works of these two men. The bibliography mentions those books
which were found central to the investigation.
The critical points are by no means the exclusive
judgments of the author, though he has attempted to include
original ones. Indebtedness to the different critics of the
two men is indicated by footnote references. Much more mate-
rial was available on Royce than on Calhoun. The recency of
Calhoun 1 s main work has not permitted published criticisms.
Hence, the criticisms of his argument and concept are in the
main original.
I ETHOD OF PROCEDURE
Relative to the problem, the contributions of Rovce
and Calhoun are given expression and then examined. In exposi
tions and criticisms an attempt is made to follow the synoptic
method of philosophy, which includes: preliminary synopsis of
unanalyzed data, experiment and analysis, rationalistic deduc-
tion, and finally synopsis based on all these stages. Some
criticism is made on specific parts of an argument, and some
deals with the whole concent. Throughout, our criterion is

i! that of coherence :( 2 ) Do the arguments and the resultant
|
concepts interpret all experience in a consistent way? Do they
I account for all the facts?
ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Chapter one states the problem chosen for the thesis,
I tells something of its history, and. explains the manner in which
I the author deals with it. Chapter two takes up the first phase,
! the problem of God m the philosophy of Josiah Royce. It pre-
j
sents an exposition and criticism of his arguments and final
conclusions. Chapter three considers the problem in the philos-
j
ophy of Robert L. Calhoun with similar treatment. The fourth
1 chanter offers a brief comparison of the arguments of the two
men. The fifth chapter presents the final summary and the
! author's conclusions. The thesis is completed with a selected
| bibliography.
2. "The coherence theorv would then offer the fol-
i| lowing criterion: Any judgment is true, if it is both self-
I consistent and coherently connected v.'ith our system of judgments
j as a whole." Brightman, ITP, 61.
j

CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM OF GOD
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF IOSIAH ROYCE
METHOD OF INVESTIGATION
One might say that Royce, in his search for proof of
God T s existence, follows the methods of a rational, or critical,
empiricist. He makes use of experience because he believes that
the only demonstrable truths of Philosophy relate to the realm
of experience. He employs reason because he finds it the most
effective method of determining the nature and meaning of ex-
perience.
Royce obtains some fact from the empirical realm and
moves from it, by inductive reasoning, to a concept of the
whole of experience. By deductive reasoning, he completes the
definition of the whole with characteristics derived from his
foundational ^remises, and, in the end, the "whole" explains
the empirical basis. The "practical" is judged by the "eter-
nal. "(3)
In practical terms, his method is to pursue those
hypotheses which avoid self-contradiction. He considers
3. Gf. Philosophical Review, V., 13. Gf. also PL, 326
and Philosphical Review, V., 13, 142: "All that is practical
borrows its truth from the Eternal." In chapter two the author
is assumed to be Royce unless otherwise stated.

! theories which have been advanced to explain the facts of
experience, discarding the inadequate ones and building a sys-
tem of his own from those which he believes to be true. The
goal is reached when he has found a series of nro"nosit ions
which cannot be denied, when he reaches the T7ought" which gives
the most inclusive view. (4-) He then tests this body of central
truth by special application.
Technically the method is comparable to the mathemat-
ical process of defining limits. His conception of Being is a
concept of that limit which is approached in one's thinking by
what one believes to be true Being, or what one means when he
\
refers to Being. Royce attempts to define this limit by deter-
I
mining the real and complete meaning of Realits^ which- is vague-
j
; ly implied in fragmentary -passing ideas.
!
'
FIELD OF INVESTIGATION
"Experience and thought," Royce states, "are upon our
I
hands; and together they determine for us the problems regard-
ing Being." (5) He bases his investigation upon those facts
which relate to the constitution of the realm of experience.
4. PR, V15, 138. "All our various selves are func-
tions not only of one another, but of one conscious Self that
somewhere and somehow pragmatically constructs an expression
li of itself in the light of which our various partial expressions
j
are judged .
"
5. fKll, 265.

He finds that as self-conscious or thinking beings, nan colors
the world of experience making it the world of idea. By ex-
amining the basic facts of experience and reasoning from their
implications, Royce attempts to determine the true nature and
meaning of the whole of experience.
PRELIMINARY DEFINITION OF GOD
As the datum of immediate experience leads directly in-
to a consideration of the meaning of ideas, Royce T s concept of
God will be the ultimate result of that investigation. The
first examination of idea reveals two meanings implied therein,
the internal and the external. Experience reveals that the pri-
mary character is the internal meaning. The nature of this in-
ternal meaning is essentially the embodiment of purpose. But
it is n incomplete and fragmentary purpose. Being, then, is
that which embodies the true internal meaning or purpose of
every finite idea. In the end this Being will be identical
with the Christian concept of God.
CLASSIFICATION
Royce finds that the basis for any concept of being
must arise from the implications of self-consciousness, for that
is the first fact revealed in experience. From this basis he
derives several facts which must be accounted for in order to
arrive at an understanding of realitjr. The several facts give
different lines of thought vhich lead to a concept of the whole.

The nature of the several facts derived permit a clas-
sification of Royce's arguments. The line of thought which
deals with the meaning of the "Self" is called the argument
from Personality, That which deals with the meaning of ideas
is classified as the Epistemological argument. That which
deals With the logical conditions necessary for the fact of
error is called the argument from the Possibility of Error.
And that which deals with the ideas of good and evil is called
the Moral argument.
These several arguments are all closely related. In
places their exposition is found in the same subject matter.
For example, in Royce's Studies of Good and JjvjLl, in the chap-
ter on the "Implications of Self-Consciousness ," a combined
expression of his Personality, Epistemological, and Error ar-
guments is found. But in the course of his T 'orks each receives
individual treatment
.
( 6
)
This classification is made for convenience and better
understanding. Royce regarded all these arguments as evidence
for his idealistic approach to reality. This is apparent as
he says:
The present paper is an effort to set forth in
brief some of the evidence for an idealistic
interpretation of the nature of reality. My
argument is in its essential features identical
with the one presented in a chapter on the
Possibility of Error in my book called The Re-
6. The Personality argument receives explicit treat-
ment in SGE, the Epistemological argument in WI(1), the Error
argument in RAP, and the Koral argument in PL»_

ligious Aspect of Philosophy, published in 1885,
mother statement of the same considerations is
to be found on pages 368-380 of my study entitled
The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. . • In a later
and extended form my view of the doctrine here
in question has so been ex-pounded in a work en-
The Conception of God, published in 1897.(7)
Each is a pert of the general approach, but in considering all
as arguments for the existence of God, they differ enough so that
hey are easily classified under different headings.
ARGUMENT FROM PERSONALITY
It is by examining the question, what self-consciousness
implies, that philosophical idealism begins. And by this ques-
tion Royce hopes to gain a clearer notion of the world and his
relation to it. Some who begin with this question give some fa-
cile answer, as "I am a thinking substance," and then pass to
bhe construction of some theological doctrine, missing the whole
significance of self-consciousness. At the same time the ex-
tremist has no right to say, "I know myself, but nothing beyond
myself," reducing the world to one T s idea of it. This extreme
shows no evidence of a thoroughgoing self-criticism.
The investigation of self-consciousness, "whose exis-
tence is to appear to a wise reflection as the fact surely in-
volved in our consciousness, "(8) may be made from two standpoints!
first, from a consideration of the inner life, and second, from
7. SGE, 140.
8. Ibid., 149.
9

a consideration of your "supposed relation to a world of objects
external to yourself ."( 9 ) The first sto.ndpoint marks the en-
trance into the argument from Personality. The second, based
upon the implications of self-consciousness and dealing with the
meaning of ideas, is classified as the E§*istetiological argument.
It is dealt with in a following section.
In immediate experience one is sure of "Self-Conscious-
ness" but far from realizing its meaning.
Its existence we know only in the sense that,
in dealing with it, we are dealing with no
unreality, but with a central problem and
principle of Knowledge. (10)
To realize the meaning of this "Self" questions raised must deal
specifically with it. How much of a "Self" is clearly known to
direct reflection? Common sense replies that it is the empir-
ical ego called by any one of us by our proper name. In other /
words, it is "the knowing Self of this moment ." (11) In my con-
sciousness are all these current ideas, feelings, thoughts,
judgments, and here am I the subject of all these. They con-
stitute what I directly know. The rest of reality is for me an
object of faith. By direct reflection I can clearly understand
my Self to be the knower of these current thoughts of this mom-
ent. Thus common sense answers the question. But does it make
9. SGS, 162.
10, Ibid., 150.
11. Loc. cit.

itself clear?
If I am the knower of this moment I MUkst define my as-
surance, AM "if it is immediate assurance, I must be able to
give at once its content •"( 12 ) But wheat I try to do this I am
at once baffled. Despite the assumption that I tefeow only the
present moment, I cannot tell the precise content of my present
moment. Before I can reflect upon it, it has become a past
m6ment. It follows then that the assumption that I am the know-
er of this present moment is false.
For I know not now in full what it is that is
present to me, nor who I myself am to whom this
is present. And I find out that I do not thus
fuller know myself at any present moment just
because, when I try to tell what I know, what
I tell about is no longer my present, but is
already my past knowledge, ( 15)
Common sense fails in Its definition of the "Self,"
but it reveals a clue. It shows that there is a difference be-
tween what I really am and what I myself take myself to be from
moment to moment, "I am twofold," (14) I have a true Self which
escapes observation and a seeking self which pursues, My true
Self is an ideal Self never fully present in any one moment.
12. SG-E, 152.
13. Loc, cit.
14. Ibid., 154.

Another way of stating the foregoing result
would, therfore, be to say that, unless I am
more than the knowing and the immediately
known self of this moment, I am not even as
much as the self of this moment .(15)
In order to be the thinking being or self of this mom-
ent, I must be organically related to the true and complete re-
flective person implied in my finite consciousness. I can come
to know the nature of this true Self by examining the logical
implications of my imperfect selfhood. My finite selfhood im-
plies that the content and meaning of ray true Self must include
my whole world of objects as well as the whole truth of my in-
ner life. (16)
If, then, this analysis of the concept of Person-
ality be sound, there is logically possible but one
existent Person, namely, the one complete Self. (IV)
CRITICISM OF ARGUMENT FROM PERSONALITY
;,
fe agree with Royce in holding that the fact of finite
personality logically implies the existence of a Supreme Being,
but for different reasons. The point that concerns Royce is
found in what is called the relation of the datum self to the
whole self. And this relation is a problem. Royce calls the
datum self the pursuing self, and the whole self the true self.
He finds that the pursuing self continually pursues the true
self, and the true self is God.
15. SGE, 162.
16. Loc. cit.
17. Loc. cit.

Another interpretation of this relation holds that the
pursuing self by memory and anticipation relates all its exper-
iences so as to identify itself as the true self of this par-
ticular moment. And that this is true is revealed "by self-ex-
perience. Does not memory link the "self" to its past exper-
iences? That I am the I who yesterday attended a class is my
knowledge "by the ability of my own mind in memory. That I will
be the I who attends a class tomorrow is likewise my knowledge
by the ability of mind in anticipating and relating. Mind, or
self, can in its experience identify its true self. That is a
fact revealed in this further examination of our self-activity
•
Thus it can be said that there is more in this self
which is certain than Royce finds. The finite self is, at the
present moment, dependent on something real other than himself,
but Royce does not have sufficient ground for his conclusion
that the finite self must be a part of the Supreme Self. It is
more empirical to explain the relation of the datum self to the
whole self as a relation possible by the ability of mind, rather1
than by "common ground" within the being of the Supreme Self,
Under this interpretation the finite self is dependent upon the
Supreme Self in a manner consistent with experience.
It must be added that Royce has overlooked the real
force of the argument from Personality, In brief, self-con-
sciousness is a fact of immediate experience, a basic fact. Now
as the concept of God must explain all facts, how better explaiij
finite personality than by a Supreme Person, God? Personality

from an impersonal source is inconceivable. What more rational
hypothesis is possible than that which holds th :t God is the
Supreme Person, the cause of finite personality? This c nsid-
eration Royce has overlooked in his speculative argument. The
conclusion of this argument is conscidered in the section deal-
ing with the character of God
.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Royce believes that an important method in seeking to
understand reality is to inquire into the meaning of the em-
pirical idea. It has been the tendency to lay stress unon the
external aspect or objective reference of ideas. For Royce,
the primary character of an idea is its internal aspect or em-
bodiment of purpose.
His definition of an idea makes it an active response
to outer sense impressions, and this resnonse is caused not by
the outer impressions but by the purpose expressed in the idea.
Consequently his definition of idea is in terms of inner mir-
pose
.
Ab idea is any state of consciousness whether
simple or complex, which, when present, is then
and there viewed as at least the partial express-
ion or embodiment of a single conscious nurpose
.
( 18
)
The basis for this conclusion is of importasiee, for
from it Royce finds his way to his concent of the Absolute.
18. WI(1), 22.

15
He justifies his conclusion by a psychological analysis of the
contents of consciousness. (19) Analysis reveals that there is
a difference between outer sense impressions and active resnon-
ses to those impressions. The active response involves much
more than the sense impression gives. It involves a conscious-
ness of how one proposes to act toward the things of : -nich he
has ideas. As in the case of a friend and an enemy, it is not
the mere sense impression that tells you it is friend or enemy;
it is consciousness of different attitudes and intended behav-
ior toward these tw© sense objects. (20) And this inner action
is th t which Royce calls the inner character or purpose of an
idea.
The inner purpose of an idea, as it gets a present con-
scious embodiment in the contents and form of an idea, consti-
tutes the internal meaning of the idea. (21) The fact that ideas
do refer beyond themselves constitutes their external meaning .(22)
The relation of these two aspects was revealed in the foregoing
consideration of the idea of a friend or an enemy. It is an
idea because one fulfills his regard l>y dwelling upon his inner
affection for that friend, by getting the idea present to mind.
But in the external sense one means the real being called friend
in as much as the idea refers to that real friend and resembles
19. WI(1),
20. Ibid.,
21. Ibid.,
22. Ibid., 26.
22 f.
21.
25.

_16
1
him. However, we must remember that the external and internal
meanings are but different aspects of the same thing. Separ-
ation is made for clarity.
This places before us the problem of the relation of
internal and external meaning of ideas. In dealing with this
problem common sense tells us that we must adjust the internal
structure of our ideas to an external structure in an indepen-
dent v.rorld of preexistent facts. This view presents a hopeless
contrast between the internal purpose and the external validity
of ide is*
In the solution of the true relation between the two
apparently different meanings of ideas, Royce believes the whole
problem of Being lies, F.e says:
I say, then, :it the outset, that the whole pro-
blem of the Nature of Being will for us, in the
end, reduce to the question: How is the inter-
nal meaning of ideas consistent with their appar-
ently external meaning? Or again: How is it
possible that an idea, which is an idea essen-
tially and primarily because of the inner pur-
; pose that it consciously fulfills by its pres-
ence,;, ?lso possesses a meaning that in any
sense appears to go beyond this internal pur-
pose? (33)
Realism offers its solution to the problem by attempt-
ing to define the reality of the world as totally independent of
jour ideas. But this independence is not consistent with our
janaljrsis of the knowing act. There is a real relation between
the knower and the object which Re lism attempts to make un-
23. 71(1), 32.
"I

jnecessary. If external objects can exist independently of ideas,
lunaffected by and indifferent to them, ideas c-n also exist as
independent facts having no need for external objects. (24) n
I
idea, looking upon the object which Realism gives it, Slight say:
I not only do not need you, but observe, upon
second thought, that I never ne -nt you at all,
never referred to " rou, never conceived you,
and, in truth, am even now not addressing you.
In short, you are nothing. ( 25
)
jThe folly of belief in an independent world of fact is apparent
to Royce. He concludes: "V/hatever Being is, it is not indepen-
dent of the ideas that refer to it." (26)
Mysticism asserts that the real cannot be wholly in-
dependent of knowledge. To be real means to the mystic to be
felt as the absolute goal. The real is immediate and knowable,
but it is also something deeper than what is usually seen or
felt by finite beings. ,/ithin the knower lies the motive that
:selects the reality for his ideas a.nd le ds him to distinguish
i
truth from error. But Royce points out that until recognized
no claim of being can be made for any object. Ivysticism holds
that reality is attained when thought is satisfied and no aues-
jtions or doubts remain. As the absolute goal, Reality is a
I
quietus of all thinking and all striving. For Royce the possess-
lion of absolute knowledge as defined by the mystic would be an
I 24. This seems to be a significant answer to Realism*
s
fundamental criticism of Idealism.
25. Wi(I), 266.
t
26. Ibid., 190. Macintosh and almost all critics criticize
i Royce for rejecting an untenable form of Realism and concluding
|jthat any realistic solution is impossible. Cf. PK, 584.

18
end of conscious thinking and therefore a zero of concious-
ness.(27) Mysticism's explanation is inadequate.
Realism and Mysticism aid in the effort to arrive at
the true concept of being by pointing out that "our finite con-
sciousness indeed seeks a meaning that it does not now find
presented." (28) But what is this meaning? So far it is not
the independent being of Realism nor the immediate datum of
Mysticism.
Critical Rationalism finds that the real "gives war-
rant to ideas, makes them true, and enables us to define de-
! terminate, or valid, possible experiences ."( 29 ) Royce noints
j
I out that mere validity is an unintelligible conception. It can
j
at the most merely tell us what reality is not by narrowing down
!
the number of possibilities. Although it is inadeauate, it con-
i
tains mucii that is true. Certainly being must be valid. It is
on the right track; it only fails to take us far enough. Val-
i idity needs to be tested, and that is accomplished as we ask,
"What is truth?"
Truth is frequently defined in terms of external mean-
|
ing as "that about which we judge. "(30) But this definition is
"oos,sible only if we regard our thought as independent of being.
1
The examination of Realism showed us how difficult it was to de-
|
fine reality as long as we sunder the external and internal
27. 191.
28. Ibid., 195.
29. Ibid., 266.
30. Ibid
.
, 270.
i
Is
12
meaning of an idea. (51)
Truth has also been defined as "correspondence between
our Ideas nd their objects. "(32) Two things are implied in
i this definition: first, if an idea is true, it must have an
I
object; and second, it must correspond to its object. Each of
these implications raises several problems. First, what is the
nature and degree of that correspondence between idea and object
when one talks of a true idea? Help on this problem comes from
the field of mathematics. It shows us, as in the c ^se of the
numbers and symbols of algebra representing objects, that two
objects need not be alike in appearance to correspond.
What is involved in correspondence is the possess-
ion, on the part of the corresponding objects', of
some system of ideally definable characters that
is common to both of them, that is, for the pur-
poses of our thought, the same in both of them,
and that is such as to meet the systematic pur-
pose for which the particular correspondence is
established. (35)
not confined to any kind or degree of general similarity to its
object, as, for example, an idea about color need not itself be
a color. Or, as Royce says, "a true idea of a dog need not it-
31. WT(1), 271, The exact nature of internal and ex-
ternal meaning is here doubtful. If he identifies them, as he
seemingly does, with knower and known, is he not deserting the
meanings he derived from his analysis?
Applying this to idea in its corresrlondence to object, idea is
32. Ibid 300.
Ibid 304.

self bark in order to be true. "(34)
This still leaves us in doubt. If an idea can differ
J
so widely from its object, if correspondence is not the test of
truth, then what is? The only answer possible, Rovce finds, is
in terms of purpose. "The idea is true if it possesses the sort
1 of correspondence to its object that the idea wants to pos-
j; 6 e s Si . " ( 55 ) And as Royce continues
:
Unless that kind, of identity in inner structure
between idea and object can be found which the
specific purpose embodied in a given idea de-
mands, the idea is false. On the other hand if
|i this particular sort of identity is to be found,
the idea is just in so far true. (36)
The conclusion from this consideration is plain. One
| cannot stand apart from the internal meaning, the conscious in-
;
ner purpose, of an idea and determine whether or not the idea
!i corresponds to its object. The criterion of truth is not ex-
f
j
ternal, it is internal. The truth of an idea cannot be deter-
\
mined by examining its external object. It is done by compar-
I ing the fulfilled idea to its own specific purpose .( 37 ) This
' inner purpose determines the sort of likeness the idea must
|
possess to be true. (33) At this point Royce finds his pre-
I liminary definition of an idea, as a state of consciousness em-
34. Wl(l) , 305.
35. Ibid., 306.
36. Log. cit.
37. The fulfilled idea is made possible by the object.
The object is important in the knowing process — bv way of ided*
i
j
58 . V/T ( U-^_3Q&

bodying a conscious purpose, justified.
It is plain now, th.vb the internal and external mean-
ing of ideas cannot be sundered. But to stop here would be to
end in subjective idealism. How can an internal meaning be
linked to an external meaning? In other words, when has an idea
an object at all?
Many older theories regard the object as cause and
prigin of ideas. This they more or less uncritically accepted
as fact. But a glance at those ideas of future events, such as
death. or an eclipse predicted for next year, refute this theory,
.
Insight into the problem is gained \Ln the Consideration
of the usual appeal to objects of vision and touch as typical
cases of objects of ideas. In these instances there is a very
typical feature of the relation of idea and object, namely,
"that an idea has an object depends at least in part upon this,
that the. idea selects its object. Tt (39) This activity of selec-
tion is manifest in consciousness bv attention. It involves the
inner meaning of an idea. Just as the sort of correspondence by
which an idea is judged is determiner' by the internal meaning of
an idea, the selection of the object, also, is determined by
it
.
( 40
)
39. Wifli, 517.
40. Ibid., 318.

Thus far two facts are plain. First, the object of an
idea is predetermined in some way.* That is, it is selected
from all other objects through the attentive interest in an ob-
ject which the internal meaning of the idea involves. And un-
less the idea is selective in this way, it can. be neither true
nor false. For in its intention to be true, it intends a sort
of correspondence with an object. This correspondence is de-
termined by the purpose embodied in the idea. (41) Second,
though the idea predetermines the object it selects and the sort
of correspondence it intends, the idea does not determine that
the object is such that the idea shall attain entire agreement
With it. (42)
In these two facts there is a contradiction. The first
shows us that the object, in so far as it is the. object of an
idea, seems to be altogether determined. The second shows us
that:
No finite idea predetermines, in its object, exact-
ly the character which, when present in the object,
gives the idea the desired truth. For observe, first,
th t the idea of the world or of space, is in any
case something other than the mere idea itself. aid
the truth of the idea depends upon a confirmation of
the ide;:? through the presence and the character of
this other, — the object. (43)
That this second point is true is evidenced by the possibility
41. WI(1), 319.
42. Loc. cit.
43. Ibid., 323.

!of error in finite ideas. If intended correspondence to a se-
ll
fleeted object were all- that was involved, each person's ideas
Iwould be true. (44) Royce here points out the place and sig-
nificance of the object in the knowing process.
In the face of these opposing facts how can the idea
be in relation to its object? The solution of this problem
jwill overcome the last obstruction in understanding the relation
between idea and object. And solution is possible.
Ideas seek their own meaning. Doing so they can be
judged by nothing but what they intend. The ideas select their
object and standard of correspondence. But at the same time the
idea regards the object as other than itself. This fact itself
is a part of what the idea means and consciously intends. (45)
And the idea, as will seeking its own fulfilment of purpose, in
jso far as it lai definite meaning and truth, selects the object
Jfco be a precisely determinate object, " such that no other object
could take its place as the object of this idea .' 7 (46) And, Rojrce
continues
:
In spite of the fact th::t the object is such
solely by the will of the idea, the idea un-
dertakes submissively to be either true or
false when compared with that object. (47)
44. ¥1(1), 324.
45. Ibid., 327.
46. Log. cit.

Royce is saying here that the correspondence intended by the
j|
purpose embodied in the idea is sought for in the object. The
possession by the object of the idea*s intentions mark it as
true. Absence of the sought for correspondence marks it as
false. This again brings to the fore the priority of idea in
the knowledge process.
The total effect of the foregoing facts is this — the
jj
idea always finds -in its object nothing but the idea f s own con-
| scious purpose or will embodied in a more determinate form than
ii
ij the ide;; possesses at this moment. Thus:
When I have an idea of the world, my idea is a
will, and the world of my idea is sixroly my own
will itself determinately embodied I (48)'
S
'.
.: .... t
i' -
.
• ;. .....
The solution to the contradiction in the true relation
j
of idea and object is now apparent. One t s "true will" is to
j seek one T s present imperfect conscious will in some more deter-
minate form. (49) The present imperfect will is the will of the
passing moment. It is the internal meaning consciously present
as fir as it goes. It is this will one seeks to bring to clear-
er consciousness. .And the object beyond, "the other," the ex-
ternal meaning, the goal of this quest, is this more determinate
48. V,rI(l), 527.
49. If the object is thus set up as the final judge is
(this not to say that the object is the real, and the idea but
ij a fragment of it? In identifying the completed "nternal mean-
| ing with the object does not Royce reject the finality of in-
i ternal meaning?

form of the present imperfect internal meaning. (50)
Understanding the relation of object to idea, what re-
sults from all this relative to the nature of reality? Just
this: if every finite idea as imperfect and indeterminate seeks
I
only, in its other, its greater determination, then at the de-
j
sired limit of determination the idea would face a present con-
| tent which would allow no other to take, for this ideal purpose,
I its place .(51) Thus, when in the case of a present and imper-
fect passing idea all possible instances that could illustrate
it were present, you would experience:
25
first, the complete fulfilment of your internal
meaning , the final satisfaction of the will em-
bodied in the idea; but secondly, also, that
absolute d eterminaion of the embodiment of your
idea as this embodiment would then be -present
,
that absolute determination of your purpose
,
i which would constitute an individual realiza-
tion of the idea. (58)
/
i This final embodiment herein described is the ultimate and ^en-
B
! uine object that any present idea seeks as its other. And this
l| is true being.
So in his consideration of ideas, beginning with a
j
datum and moving to the whole, 3oyce finds a demand for the
concept of an individual being. The very incompleteness of our
50. Royce does not explain how the idea finds more in
the object than its purposes intend.
51. WI(1), 336. But how could the incomplete idea of
this moment ever know this limit?
52. Ibid., 338 f.

li present ideas demands a completely individual fulfilment. In
i
this aiaet the fact that every other concent is self-contradictory
|| and that denial involves inherent affirmation lies the logical
i
j| necessity of his fourth concept of being. (55) In final state-
!!
jj
ment it runs:
What is , or wh.-'t is real, _is a_s such the complete
embodiment
, in ind ividual form _Jid in final ful-
filment
, of the internal meaning of finite ideas . ( 54
)
jj
This being the nature of being, we can define an idea as true
| when it corresponds to its own final and completely individual
il
[!
expression. ( 55 ) As all finite ideas, fragmentary and imperfect,
jj
must be fulfilled we must conclude that the final concept of
1 being is an individual life present as a whole. Our very power
|
to make the whole of being, the universe, our problem has as the
|
fulfilment of one idea the constitution of a single life of con-
's
crete fulfilment. "All varieties of individual expression are
j
j
thus subordinate to the unity of the whole. "(56)
The final concent of being is an individual life
9 present as a whole. It is at once a system of facts and the
j
fulfilment of whatever purpose a finite idea imperfectly embod-
ies. It is the completed will, the completed life of experience^
fulfilling the will and experience of any finite idea. Royce
concludes
:
53. 71(1) , 548 f
.
54. Ibid., 339.
55. Loc . cit.
56. Ibid., 394.

What is, is for us no longer a mere form,
but a Life; and in our world of what was
before mere truth the light of individuality
and of will have finally begun to shine.
The sun of true Being has arisen before our
eyes
.
( 57
)
CRITICISM OF EPISTET.IOLOGICiLL AROTMJT
This particular idealistic argument is acceptable. It
presents an interpretation of facts as they are known to finite
man. The first datum of experience is the self-experience . In
self-experience we are thinking beings. It is legitimate pro-
cedure to seek the ultimate explanation of the universe through
that which is most near to our being. In this argument Royce
begins not by asking what we know and reasoning from these facts
to an interpretation of the world -ground but by asking Sow can
we know, how is it possible for us to gain knowledge, ideas?
Variant interpretations of Royce' s argument are possible
It is at times difficult to ascertain just what interpretation
Royce himself is giving to the several facts up for considera-
tion. Some confusion is caused by Royce 1 s ambiguous use of
terms. Cunningham thinks this double use of terms troublesome
even to Royce. (58) Ambiguity is apparent as he develops the
internal and external meaning of ideas. By express statement
these are but two different aspects of the same thing, separated
abstractly for clarity. But later he seems to employ the terms
in a separate sense, internal meaning representing the idea and
57. • '71(1)
,
348 f
.
58. Cunningham, IARBAP, 58.
£7

external meaning the object.
At times it sounds as if Royce goes to the extreme
making the idea predetermine the object known. If this be his
.
conclusion then disagreement follows. But his insistence upon
otherness of the object makes it plain that the object is given
its significant place in the knowing process. (59)
When Royce concludes that the idea determines its own
correspondence, I do not believe he is saying that the idea
determines what is to be found in the object. Rather that the
idea determines what correspondence is to be looked for in the
object. The idea does determine what correspondence is to be
looked for, and as it looks for it and finds it, then in a
sense it has predetermined what was in the object. Royce could
have carried his analysis further, showing what bearing experi-
ence has upon an idea. He neglected this aspect of the idea,
gerhaps an unnecessary one for his purposes. But by omitting
ca consideration of experience, he leaves us with uncertainty
as to how the idea gains the information which makes corre-
spondence possible. Sow does the idea find it possible to look
for points a priori ? Or are they gained through experience?
Royce leaves one with the feeling that the correspondence is
contained in fragmentary form in the idea and the idea's pur-
poses cause it to seek for a more determinate embodiment. On
this view "knowledge is inherent in the mind of man. All that
59. VJI(I), 327. "...The idea undertakes submissively
to be either true or false when compared with that object."

is necessary is realization of all that is in mind. But the
interpretation that holds to the view that knowledge of things
is inherent in mind does not leave room for the empirical. It
is more true to experience to hold that mind possesses the
abilities which make knowledge a possibility. Under this inter-
pretation the object can influence the idea and other ideas
influence other ideas, and this is what happens in our experi-
ence .
In showing that ideas are expressions of embodied
purpose, Royce T s argument leads us to a purposive concept of
being. The concept of an Absolute Person, purposive and dy-
namic, is compatible with the finite man controlled by purpose.
Royce' s conclusion is consistent with the empirical basis.
However, after following Royce through his illuminating
discussion of ideas, there is a decided let down in his deduc-
tions. Ee finds that ideas seek for individual expression in
the beyond, and from this concludes that the ultimate being
must be individual. This conclusion is a broad jump unconvino-
ihgly made. The line of thought expressing it runs: "As all
ideas seek individual expression and it is possible to have an
idea of the universe, the whole of - being, then the whole is a
unity, an individual." This line of reasoning sounds much like
the traditional ontological argument which Kant convincingly -
disproved
.
Royce finds that the imperfect idea seeks its greater
determination and true being is present when the idea reaches

the desired limit of determination which would allow no other
to take its place. The nuestion here would he; Would the de-
i sired limit of determination be identical with God. As Kant
pointed out relative to the causal argument , going from cause
to effect ad infinitum does not lead us to God. The first
cause reached by this process is hypothesis. Eomewhere in the
:
infinite regress one must stop and say this is first cause, God,
In so doing one does not end with God, but an hypothesis that
I the posited first cause is God. The same criticism can be
made relative to Royce T s "limit of determination". Somewhere
| the idea must stop and say, "This is the limit ; all possible
i fulfilments are present; I am in the presence of true being'.'
| Thus the idea merely posits this limit as the finally deter-
minate fulfilment
.
Relative to the foregoing conclusion difficulty arises
in the maintenance of consistency between derived facts and
deduction. By definition finite ideas are imnerfect, frag-
mentary. They are finite because they are imperfect. If this
be true, then the question arises as t o how the iirroerfdct idea
can ever know the "desired limit of determination". Or again
if the imperfect finite idea can know the limit of determina-
tion, then that limit is necessarily imperfect. On the sur-
face Royce seemingly gives a basis for certainty, but examina-
tion shows no trustworthy basis. There is no doubt that the
completely determined idea would be in the presence of true
being, but there is doubt, as Royce presents the case, that

the finite idea could realize the finally deterninate forrn^,
Criticism may be made on his criterion of truth, in-
ternal correspondence .( 60 ) His criterion runs: It is true —
this instant's idea -- if, in its own measure, and on its own
plan, it corresponds, even in its vagueness, to its own final
and complete individual expression. And this correspondence
is intended. by the idea.. '
According to the several definitions involved in this
criterion of truth, it can never determine the truth or falsity
of an idea. For the truth of an idea can only be judged by its
"own measure and on its own plan." As the ideas own measure
and own plan is, according to Royce, indefinite, vague, and
fragmentary, the idea can never get beyond itself to its own
final and complete individual expression. This criterion is
apt to be lost in the desire expressed in any idea.
Further, if the idea of an object is determined by
the purpose embodied in the idea, how can this purpose be set
up as a test for truth? This, in effect, is to make the idea
the criterion for the idea. Truth on this basis is never ac-
cessible to us for we are by our very natures limited to the
fragmentary and incomplete purpose.
60. .,fI(I), 559. >7e label Royce T s criterion of truth
"internal -correspondence" for the reason that it differs from
the common theory of correspondence. Rather than correspond-
ence beWeen idea and object it is between incomplete idea and
complete idea.
I
It is also noticeable that Rovce uses the criterion
of coherence. His entire investigation rests upon an appeal to
this test for truth. Coherence is best; summed up "by asking —
does this idea, which explains this fact, fit into the most
rational whole of experience? Rovce' s use of this method is
apparent in his consideration of Realism, Mysticism, and Criti-
cal Rationalism.
Royce very explicitly finds correspondence, as it is
commonly understood, inadequate .( 61) Yet in the end is not
correspondence between an incomplete and fragmentary idea and
its finally determinate^ and complete expression equally im-
possible?
D. C. Macintosh criticizes Royce for following psy-
chological idealism, which says that things depend for their
existence upon their being in the mind, or at least in the
conscious relation to some subject .( 62 ) This is what R. B.
Perry has labelled "the egocentric predicament ."(63) If
Macintosh interprets Royce as maintaining this position with
finite beings and their world, one must disagree. At times it
does seem that Royce makes the finite ' idea- 'the cause behind $he
object's existence. But his position holds that the object is a
true ."other" independent of finite ideas. The idea selects
its object, true, but it can in no way determine what that
— r
ri(I)) 3Q1 f<
62. Macintosh, PK, 94.
63. Perry, PPT, 129 f.
•
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object is. "The idea undertakes submissively to be either true
or false when compared with that object . " ( 64) Relative to the
world-ground there is no apparent objection to the view "that
things exist in the mind of the Supreme Person.
In feneral Royce's analysis of the knowledge "Process
is valid. As it stands it is a cogent presentation of the
idealistic position. But Royce's several conclusions drawn from
this analysis do not merit the logical necessity which he finds
theirs. From an empirical basis he deduced points which are not
consistent with experience.
ARGul£2NT FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF ERROR
Royce leads into the problem of error in a very direct
manner. After establishing his idealistic postulates he permits
the haunting thought of doubt to confront us. Skepticism de-
clares all postulating to be in error. But there is a clue,
even in this most thorough doubting. Implied in it is the fact
"that we can be in error about an external world. "(65) If
skepticism says that no absolute truth exists, then, it must add
that "no absolute truth exists save this truth itself, that no
absolute truth exists. "(66)
If one could see what is involved in this fact of error,
absolute truth would be possible.
,
Examining logical conditions
64. 171(1) , 327.
65. RAP, 392.
66. Ibid., 376.

34
necessary for error, Royce considers several descriptions of
error, such as: the idea that fails to agree with its object,
and the psvchological conditions for error. These however are
inadequate. Considering several classes of error, such as:
error about one's neighbor's mind, and the expected future, he
finds that common sense has so arranged judgments and their
relations that error is logically impossible.
Solution comes to this problem in dropping the common
sense view that I and all else are separate self-existent beings,
and regarding the knower and the object known as present to a
third thinker whose thoughts include both. (67) You and I and
all objects are present to this All-Inclusive Thought. He is
able to view our ideas and the objects referred to and deter-
mine their truth and falsity.
And to sum up, let us overcome all our
difficulties by declaring that all the many
Beyonds, which single significant judgments
seem vaguely and separately to postulate,
are present as fully realized intended ob--
(
jects to the unity of an all-inclusive,
absolutely clear, universal, and conscious
thought, of which all judgments, true or
false, are but fragments, the whole being
at once Absolute Truth and Absolute
Knowledge
.
( 68
)
CRITICISM OF ARGUMENT FROK POSSIBILITY OF ERROR
This unique argument demands careful consideration. In
its treatment Royce avoids much of the ground upon which Cunning-
67. RAP, 442.
j
* 68 • Ibid., 423. Such a conclusion does overcome many'
difficulties, but it also leads one into many new difficulties.

ham criticizes him. In this argument Royce treats in a less
direct way the meaning of an idea. That he here holds to the
priority of internal meaning is evident in his discussion of
the common sense view of error. (69) However his final concent
of being does not here, as in his Epistemological argument,
depend upon this aspect of ideas. It is used here to show how
common theories as to the possibilitv of error are impossible
and untenable
.
( 70
)
The errors of finite beings are made as finite beings
judge an act as true or false tinon the basis of coherence.
Hence one is in error because his idea does not interpret the
object known in the light of the most comprehensive whole of
experience. And it is a society of persons who set up this
whole of experience. So man is judged by men. And for- all
practical consequences such judgments are valid. However,
these judgments are not always true judgments. For in experi-
ence society has been known to reject an idea yet in the end
accept it. This points to the objectivity of truth which is
essentially the fact established by Royce' s argument from the
possibility of error. Truth is possible or error is possible
only through a Supreme Being v/ho judges an idea true or false.
The whole force of this argument lies in the fact that there is
69. RAP, 396.
70. If his priority of internal meaning be unaccept-
able, the several explanations of error must be reexamined in
light of the accepted view.
•. _ _ .
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truth and error and that objects in no way become a part of the
subject.
However it is not necessary to conclude that God is an
All-inclusive Being because error is possible about all ideas
of all things. Here it is enough to point out that it is not
necessary for God to be all-inclusive in order to judge all
ideas. It is enough for God to know all objects and ideas
about those objects and unnecessar3r to include all in his being.
Is it not enough to say that God can make all ideas his own and
by knowing the object referred to by the idea affirm or reject
it? This conclusion avoids many of the difficulties into which
Royce's view takes one.
This argument has a close relation to what is known
as the moral and religious arguments. These point to the
objective existence of value in a Supreme Being. Royce's
argument, that God is the Being necessary to make ideas true
or false, -closely approximates the nature of such arguments .( 71
)
If truth be objective, then it must be explained by a Supreme
Being of some sort. This argument confirms our belief in the
objectivity of trut.h. But this does not validate Royce's fur-
ther conclusion, that God is the Absolute All-inclusive Being.
Such a concept is derived from a one-sided interpretation of
the knowing process. This further conclusion fails to leave
one satisfied with the way in which it returns to explain its
71. See the following discussion of Royce's moral
argument
.
r #
empirical "basis.
My concept of God is different and yet not so different.
In brief, Ee is the Supreme Person, the YJorld-ground , the Cause
and Sustainer of all that is . Furthermore , it is he who makes
ideas true or false, but it is unnecessary to conclude that he
is an absolute being in the Roycean sense.
A further point which may be urged against both inter-
pretations of this argument is expressed in the question: How
do we know that this argument does not establish the objectivity
of error rather than truth? This is a puzzling question. On
the basis of this single argument there is no answer. To be
consistent it must be concluded that this argument merely
establishes the fact of a Supreme Being, i'is exact nature must
be determined on the basis of other facts, however, that is
possible on the basis of other facts.
MORAL ARGUMENT
In discussing the moral life Royce finds the supreme
moral principle to be loyalty to loyalty
.
( 7 2 ) This is deducible
from the moral life of human persons. But to talk of a moral
life without relating man to his place in the real universe
opens any theory to serious ob jections
.
( 75 ) It is in his ef-
forts to show the metaphysical basis of the principle of loy-
alty that Royce presents his moral argument.
72. PI, 201.
73. Ibid., 301.
1i
c
c
Loyalty is a service of causes and causes link human
lives into the unity of one life. (74) Therefore, if the moral
principle of loyalty has any basis, hum-n lives can he linked
in some genuine spiritual unity. This essentially is the ar-
gument in brief. The question now is: Is such unity a fact? (7 5]
That it is, is evidenced by the fact that if man vrere not link-
ed by genuine spiritual ties he would not remain loyal. The
very fact of loyalty implies the spiritual life. It is also
evidenced by the fact that a loyal man gets food by believing
his cause has real existence outside of his private self. "The
loyal man* s good is essentially an anticipation of a good that
he regards as not his ovm, but as existent in the cause." (76)
And if p.is loyalty is indeed vrell founded, there
must be unities of spiritual life in the universe
such that no one man ever, by himself, experiences
these unities as facts of his ovm consciousness...
A spiritual unity of life, which transcends the
individual experience of any man, must be real.
For loyalty, as we have seen, is a service of
causes that, from the human point of view, appear
superpersonal
.
( 77
)
If this be right, the real goodness of these unities is never
completely manifested to any one or a group of men. "Such good-
ness, then, if corroletely experienced at all, must be experi-
enced upon some higher level of consciousness than ony one hu-
man being ever reaches ."( 78
)
74. EL, 501.
75. Loc. cit.
76. Ibid., 308.
77. Ibid., 309.
78. Ibid., 310.
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Thus it is that unity is a fact and that it must be
! based upon the unit^ r of the spiritual life which transcends
j the individual experience of any man. But how can one be sure
| of this transcendent spiritual unity? To establish this cer-
tainty Royce identifies loyalty with truth seeking; "Truth
seeking and loyalty are therefore essentially the same process
j
of life merely viewed in two different aspects (79) His
|j problem is now to establish the objectivity of truth. To do
|
this he shows the inadequacy of pragmatism as a theory of truth
I and continues to establish the objectivity of truth through
the consideration of error. This consideration reveals that if-
our ideas are false they are false because there exists that
real state of facts which determines our ideas as true or false
f&lse. (30)
CRITICISM OF MORAL ARGUMENT
This argument is the most cogent and consistent of the
i ; *
'
I
Roycean arguments. Royce here shows that the nature of the
I
jj
moral life implies a unity which lies beyond the experience of
j any man or group. He here points out the evidence for the
j
objectivity of the moral life in finite experience. That these
i
I
evidences do point to a unity Which does go beyond finite ex-
i
perience is an acceptable point. But bevond the practical
i
\
evidence he advances his unique argument from the possibility
|
of error as a powerful theoretical argument for the objectivity
M
j
79. PL, 314.
80. Ibidl, 342.

of morals.
As pointed out in dealing with this argument from
error
,
it does point to the ob jectivit3f of truth. Perhaps
some would object to Royce T s identification of loyalty with
truth, of morality with truth. Here perhaps lies a point for
controversy and possible destruction of this particular argu-
ment. However we hold with Royce that the one is but the other
in a different aspect. If morality is anything it is true and
of value. If truth is anything it is of moral worth. And if
anything be of value, is it not morality and truth? Agree-
ment on this point does not commit one to his further conslus-
ions .
t,
In substantiating his argument by the argument from
the possibility of error, Royce -gives the argument from morals
a unique expression. His critics must deal with this further
theoretical ground for the objectivity of morals. Philosophers
dealing with the problems and history of Dhilosophy generally
fail to mention Royce T s moral argument for the existence of
God. Why this is so is not clear. His argument merits a
conspicuous place among the many expressions of the moral
argument
.
i

ROYCE 1 S CONCEPT OF THE CHARACTER OF GOD
In portraying the character of the God established by
his arguments, Royce deduces necessary attributes from the es-
tablished hypothesis. The exposition of this paper considers
each attribute separately, showing how Royce considers it a
necessary concept* The foundational arguments are of little
concern in this section of the thesis. Except to note incon-
sistencies or agreement between argument and conclusion, they
are not considered.
Omniscience.
The all important divine attribute is omniscience,
which Royce seeks to establish as necessary to his concept of
being,. If God can be shown to be an omniscient being, his
character would involve as a consequence other attributes "that
we could at pleasure express under other names." (81)
Omniscience means the possession "to the full all lo-
gically possible knowledge, insight, wisdom. "(82) This divine
attribute is established in the consideration of the nature of
a being sufficient to explain all finite ideas. As finite
knowers and objects known were considered, it v\as found that
81. COG, 8.
82. Ibid., 7.
-o !
?.q on -
for both to be involved in an act of knowledge under finite limi-
tations it was necessary for both to be included in a third being
whose knowledge included both© There is possible an infinite
number of knowers, an infinite number of objects, and an even
greater number of possibilities* To include all of these the
necessary being must possess all logically possible knowledge,
Absolute Thought 9 And as all possible ideas must be experienced
and judged by the third being, he is Absolute Experience . In so
far as this necessary being is Absolute Thought and Absolute
Experience, he is an Omniscient Being.
Criticism.
With this interpretation of omniscience Royce ends in
epis temological monism. This is clear as it is remembered that
to be true or false an idea must be included, with its object,
in the Mind of God. Epis temological monism is not untenable.
And Royce 1 s conclusion is consistent with his system. But it
raises many difficult problems which epistemological dualism
avoids. (83) Most notable among these is the problem of evil and
the problem of finite knowledge. Royce avoids much criticism in
maintaining the finite duality of subject and object. But finite
duality is man's because of his incomplete and fragmentary na-
ture© In reality the finite idea and object of that idea are
one. It appears to man as "other" because of his finitude.
85. Cf. Brightman, ITP, 74 f«
1
oa a.
10 lo
r or
Royce attains fundamental unity but he does so at the expense of
finite experience., Finite experience becomes illusory.
Unity,
Omniscience implies unity. As all knowers and objects
known exist in actual or possible relations to each other, then
all must be present to a single unity of consciousness <>
Criticism.
That God is one is an acceptable point. But unity can
be obtained on a basis more true to experience. The Roycean
God is one because he is everything, quantitatively and quali-
tatevely. This concept is difficult to understand. If finite
experience be real, then it must be real just as experienced.
This being so, then it must exist in relation to the world-
ground in a manner that does not deny its reality or trust-
worthiness* To make man a part of God is to deny his exper-
ience of independence* In granting Royce this type of monism
one faces the problem of reconciling man's experience with God*s
experience. At this point, also, the Roycean concept is not
consistent with finite experience.
-r
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Eternality.
The Divine attribute of eternality is derived by a con-
sideration of our temporal experience. The real world is a
temporal order. (84) In fact no other than a temporal meaning
is in any way definable for our cons -1 ousness
.
( 85) This being
the case, the real world is a temporal series of events 0 For
man this temporal series is capable of infinite divisibility.
But this temporal world regarded in its wholeness is an eternal
order o Which means that the whole content of this temporal or-
der is at once consciously experienced as a whole by the Ab-
solute. (86)
Our view declares that all the life of the
world, and therefore all temporal sequences
are present at once to the absolute. (87)
As the individual views the events of the temporal order, they
are divided with reference to his point of view into "what now
is, and what no longer is, and what is to be, but jLs not yet ." (8£
However these same events are for the Absolute all equally pre-
sent* And presence in this sense is what is me^nt by the eter-
nal order of the world.
84. WI(1)
,
134.
85. Ibid. 156.
86. Ibid. 158.
87. Ibid. 140.
88. Ibid. 141.
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Eternal, since it is inclusive of all distinctions
of temporal past and temporal future, eternal,
since, for this very reason, the totality of tem-
poral events thus present at once to the Absolute
has no events that precede, or that follow it, but
contains all sequences within it, — eternal, fin-
ally, because this view of the world does not, like
our partial glimpses of this or of that relative
whole of sequence, pass away and give place to some
other view, but includes an observation of every
passing away, of every sequence, of every event and
of whatever in time succeeds and follows that event,
and includes all the views that are taken by the va-
rious finite Selves o (89)
Criticism.
As Royce's Absolute includes all time sequences which
for us are past and future as well as present, his concept im-
plies divine foreknowledge* If foreknowledge be a fact, then
all future events are determined, even the choices which man
will make 0 Thus the reality of man's freedom disappears. And
if finite freedom be mere appearance, then the goodness of God
becomes questionable. (90)
Absolute Will.
So far, God is merely a passive being, knowing and ex-
periencing all. To be an active creator he must will. But
what is will and how is God able to will? Viewing the power
to will in finite beings, analysis reveals that it involves the
89. WI(1), 141*
90. The same criticism can be made against traditional
theism.
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preference of some datum attended to over against other data
that remain. It is then the act of attending to a datum to the
exclusion of others. (91) But how can God do this?
As previously stated, the Absolute is a unified being.
Its contents form one moment. Its unity is the unity of a single
instant. It neither requires nor permits a beyond. (92) Yet the
very nature of the thinking act involves the thinking of unreal-
ized possibilities. Here is the problem. How can the system be
a unified system, a whole, in the face of unrealized possibil-
ities? The answer comes as the element of Divine Will is added
which in operation, realizing that the absolute system of ideas
is fulfilled in this world, says:
"... f There shall be no world but this, 1 1* e_. no
other case of fulfilment; and therefore other ab-
stractly oossible fulfilments remain not genuin-
ely possible." It is this aspect of the ultimate
situation which defines the world as a Whole, and
which, without introducing an external cause, or
a mere force, does as it were colour the whole un-
ity of the Absolute Consciousness with a new char-
acter, namely, the character of Will. (93)
Criticism.
The addition of this voluntarist ic element is found
more in his later works. Thilly suggests that it was the result
91.
92.
93.
COG, 192.
Ibid., 210.
Ibid., 212.

of the nature of the problems he was dealing with and partly in
order to escape the criticism of exaggerating the intellectual-
istic element. (94)
In order to account for the particular unity of this
world, Royce introduces the element of will. Absolute Will
determined that the Absolute Being choose this world to the
exclusion of all other possibilities. This world was chosen
because it best fulfilled the purposes of the Absolute. Why it
does this must remain a mystery. This makes us question the
li _
moral nature of the Absolute. This world appears to be very
imperfect for God's purposes as we can know them. And our
knowledge of those purposes reveals them as morally good. If
this world best suits the Absolute's purposes then his purposes
must be other than good, for a world is conceivable which
excludes the active influence of evil, making goodness a greater
possibility. If the Absolute chose this world as the best,
among other purposes, for moral purposes, then finite experience
of morals and their ends must view God as finite, for the moral
life seeks to eliminate a great deal that is too much a part of
our world.
This world, as known to finite beings, does not fulfill
94. Thilly, HP, 561. Kowison criticizes Royce for this
decidely intellectualistic interpretation. Cf. GOG, 81-132.
I
GocMs known purposes. Much of the world might be overcome to
realize a better possible world. Surely the Roycean God knew
the best possible world and that this world was not the best
possible. Why did not God choose that possibility toward which
finite beings are striving?
Divine Love.
The fact that the Absolute Will wills that there shall
be no other world than this leads to the attribute of Divine
|Love. As will is the aspect of selective attention in conscious
ness, love is the affection of consciousness which involves
selection of content as valuable. Love in finite being is pre-
ferred by virtue of characters that remain undefinable. To the
loving consciousness no other object could fill the place of
the beloved object. Love in the Absolute consciousness exem-
plifies this generalized definition of love. (95) This world
has value for the Absolute as no other world would have. The
inexplicable aspect of Divine Love is "why some other world,
with a different sequence of data, might not fulfill, just as
well, the same ideas". (96) It is Divine Will and Divine Love
that constitutes the individuating process of Absolute Being.
By Divine Will the individual becomes an individual because he
95. COG, 215.
96. Loc. cit.

Hbecomes the object of an exclusive interest .( 97) Divine Love
renders individuality intelligible, as the fulfilment of the
very exclusiveness of love. (98)
Criticism.
The addition of Divine Love to the character of God,
|in this sense, adds little. As the affection of consciousness
hich involves selection of content as valuable, the attribute
of love causes the Absolute to select this world as its object.
But this world is not an object for the Absolute. It is the
Absolute himself. Is it possible for God to love himself?
If God selected this world as that one which best expressed his
ideas, as the object of his selection, how could it be a part of
his being? The selected world can in no way be a part of God.
This world has value for the Absolute as no other world
would have. Is this world, then, final? Can it not change?
Does this world embody the complete purpose of God? If so it
follows that God is a capricious moral agent, good at one time
and evil at another. If it be said that evil, is not really
evil, that in the sight of the Absolute it appears as part of
divine plan, then the Absolute attains perfection at our expense.
Furthermore, love in finite beings enci^ts betvreen t#0 Sistiitet
97. COG, 258.
98. Ibid., 266.

^persons dependent Upon a < common source. How can the
[Absolute express this character of love as there is no object
other than himself for him to love? Royce's interpretation of
pivine Love does, if his absolute be accepted, offer an ex-
planation of finite individuality. This interpretation stands
or falls with this system.
Morality.
Absolute Being is morally good. As God must judge all
desires of finite being, so must the desire and the possessor be
included in a higher thought which actually possesses the de-
sired good thing. Above every desire there exists the satisfac-
tion of the desire in the higher thought. (99) Royce concludes:
The world then, as a whole, is and must be
absolutely good, since the infinite thought must
know what is desirable, and knowing it, must have
present in itself the true objects of desire. (100)
Criticism.
Though Royce's moral argument is valid, this further
development of divine character is unacceptable. Any theory of
being which is identified with God must explain in a consistent
way the fact of evil as finite beings experience it.
For the metaphysical monist the fact of evil is a real
problem. If God be all, how explain the fact of evil in a
99. RAP, 444.
100. Loc. cit.

consistent way with his goodness. The monist has several ways
of disposing of this problem. He can first of all deny the
existence of evil. This method Royce finds unacceptable.
Finite experience affirms the reality of evil. (101) Viewing evil
as caused by Divine Being, there is but one course open. And
that is to affirm the necessary and constitutive aspect of evil
in the moral life. There are two methods of accounting for this
"necessary and constitutive aspect of evil." One is to account
for it as the conditions of the moral life so willed by God.
The other is to account for it as a condition forced even upon
God. The question is: Which makes for a more coherent inter-
pretation of God as a good God? The first of these is the path
of the Absolutist, for to affirm the second would be to deny the
complete unity which the Absolutist seeks. However, the second
path offers the most coherent explanation of the fact of evil
and the goodness of God.
In explaining the metaphysical significance of finite
experience of evil, Royce finds that it has its place in the
life of Divine Being. As we are one with God, part of his life,
our suffering is his suffering.
Here is the first truth: when you suffer, your
sufferings are God ' s sufferings
, not his external
work, not his external penalty, not the fruit of
his neglect, but identically his own personal woe. (102)
101. SGE, 17 f.
102. Ibid., 14.

But the real problem is found in asking why man and God
must suffer. Royce finds:
The sole possible, necessary, and sufficient ans-
wer is, because without suffering, without ill,
without woe, evil, tragedy, God's life could not
be perfected. (103)
In the explanation of how existent evil should be treated, this
is acceptable. But as an explanation of the existence of evil,
it is very unsatisfying. Why is it necessary that perfection of
God's Being involves the overcoming of evil?
! The Absolutist finds evil to be the method of God's
perfection. (104) Thus evil as we experience it is due to the
will of God. .But this interpretation reflects upon the goodness
of God, for evil is very undesirable to finite beings. To meet
ijthis point, Royce finds that evil is in the end but a part of
a greater good. In God's plan it serves to bring about the good.
So in God's understanding, what is seen as evil is but an aspect
of the good. (105)
This is a very unsatisfying interpretation of finite
experience. Evil is very real and the antithesis of the good,
though good can be realized from evil. If God suffers in our
suffering, he must experience evil in much the same way as we,
otherwise our experience is not His experience. If God ex-
103. SGE, 14
104. Loc. cit.
105. RAP, 451.
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periences evil as but an aspect of a larger good, then he be-
comes perfect at our expense, for we fall to realize this
greater significance of evil. God surely could not suffer in
our suffering if he experienced it as a part of goodness. That
would be hypocrisy. But if He does, how can we reconcile the
finite point of view with the Absolute point of view?
Royce's interpretation is consistent with his concept
of Absolute Being. But it seems more consistent with finite
experience to find evil as a necessary condition not due to the
Will of God, but forced upon him by the nature of His being. (106)
Such an interpretation gives us a real necessity for evil, gives
it a reality that our experience reveals it to have, and avoids
any reflection on the moral character of God. Relative to the
thought leading to the attribute, it is to be noted that the
same method can be used with as much authority to show that God
is an evil being. "The world then, is a whole, is and must be
absolutely evil since the infinite thought must know what is
undesirable, and knowing it, must have present in itself the
true objects not to be desired."
Personality.
The attribute of personality is established in Royce's
argument from personality. He finds that our fimite self-
106. For that which we believe the most consistent
interpretation of this view see Brightman, PG and FG.
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consciousness logically implies the existence of one true
Person. This is clear as one considers one's own self and.
thought in reference to a world of objects. In order for our
fragmentary selves to he the self of this moment or the being
who thinks about this world of objects, they "must be organ-
ically related to a true and reflective Person whom your finite
consciousness logically implies."
The character of personality is also implied in the
unity of Absolute Being. If God is the All-Knower, then it is
necessary that he be one. If he is one, it must be unity in
the self-consciousness of an All-Knower, and because he is self-
conscious he is also a Person.
Criticism.
As the argument from the meaning of ideas led primarily
to the concept of an omniscient being, thus eventuating in
epistemological monism, the argument from personality results in
the view that there is but one being metaphysical monism.
Among monists there is possible a distinction relative to the
nature of the final monism. If the monism is in terms of
quantity, the label is Quantitative Monism. If the monism is in
terms of like quality, the label is Qualitative Monism. Royce
affirms both these types of monism. His Absolute Being is
quantitatively and qualitatively One*

The one great danger in any form of monism is the loss
of individual selves in the One being. It becomes the problem
of the one and many. In Royce* s system the importance and place
of the One is clear, but the exact meaning of the many is
doubtful. The main criticism of this point, in the main, is
that Royce fails to explain selfhood consistent with finite
experience of it.
That Royce fully intended this Absolute Unity is
evidenced by the general trend of his thinking and his many
explicit statements to that end. (107) For him the final unity
of all life is found in the concept of an All-inclusive conscious
Person. This, he considers, the logical outcome of his in-
vestigation.
But, relative to finite selves, what are the conditions
upon which this unity is established? Consideration of the
knowing process revealed that everything must exist in and for
an Absolute Mind. Thus he established his unity. Material
things are not material but states of the Absolute consciousness.
Finite selves become but active phases of Divine thought. As
Johnson points out, it is difficult to reconcile these assump-
tions with experience .( 108) But if such assumptions be ac-
cepted, his conclusion follows.
107. CF. WI(I), 341, 394, 401, 424, and SMP, 307.
108. Johnson, JRPR, 185.
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Johnson points out that in his epistemological and
metaphysical monism Royce surrenders the identity of the human
self. This is plain in his metaphysical monism as he insists
that finite selves are but parts of the Absolute Self. It is
not so plain in his epistemological monism for on the human
plane he insists on the dualist ic nature of the knowing act.
However, as previously stated, this dualism is only in appearance*
In reality such is not the case for in Absolute Mind both subject
and object exist. Finite epistemological dualism is lost in
Infinite epistemological monism. "He saves the unity of the
World-Self by at last denying the ultimate distinctness and
self-identity of finite selves ."(109) That this is the case is
shown as Royce states:
And the true Self is inclusive of the whole world
of objects. Or, in other words, the result is,
that there is and can be but one complete Self,
and that all finite selves, and their objects,
are organically related to this Self, are moments
of its completeness, thoughts in its thought, and,
as I should add, Wills in its Will, Individual
elements in the life of the Absolute Individual. (110)
In establishing the organic unity of the Absolute at
the expense of finite selfhood, Royce denies many empirical
data which are more certain than Absolute unity. (Ill) Self-
consciousness as we experience it is ours, and ours as indepen-
dent individuals, not as parts of a whole. The individual
109. Johnson, JRPR, 197.
1X0. SGE, 146. .
111. Johnson, JRPR, 198.
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experiences wholeness which resists all fusion into a larger
whole. Royce in the end denies self-consciousness as the
experience of an independent individual. If our experience be
so untrustworthy, how can it be trusted in any case as a
starting point?
The conclusion that God is a person under such cir-
cumstances is to destroy the whole meaning of personality as
experienced by finite beings. An essential to personality is
that there shall be interaction with other persons. Where is
this possible in a system which finds only one true Person?
If all find their being in the one Self, wherein lies
:;
the necessity for a finite moral life? In the end perfection
will be the lot of this One Self, and finite selves, good or
bad, will share equally as parts in this Self. And if selves
I] are not real selves, how can God be an ethical being? Is he
i
)
not perfecting his own being at our expense? ( 112)
!
And finally, in the reduction of all to one Self
Royce denies his social metaphysic
.
( 113) A social universe
with one person is impossible. Society can only mean a
1
1 number of persons. This empirical fact is denied or at least
i
explained away«
I
112. Johnson, JRPR, 199.
113. Loc. cit.

These criticisms are invalidated if Royce's inter-
pretation is held to allow for finite selfhood. But in denying
metaphysical and epistemological distinctness to finite selves,
he denies the evidence for pluralism. Consequently this
interpretation does not satisfy finite experience. The
resultant status of the finite self is perhaps true to his
system, but not to the empirical basis*

CHAPTER III
THE PROBLEM OF GOD
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OP ROBERT L. CALHOUN
METHOD OP INVESTIGATION
Calhoun, as Royce, begins with experience and arrives
at the point which demands the concept of God as the most
rational explanation of experience, Royce, using the empirical
basis as a starting point, soon moved into the speculative field;
but Calhoun remains throughout close to the empirical basis. In
the end it is this same basic fact which demands the concept of
God. Royce 's method differs in that logical necessity comes
from implications which grow out of a consideration of the base.
Calhoun purposely holds himself to experience, as he has little
interest in speculative theory. (114) His primary aim in pre-
senting his work keeps him from the speculative field.
However, as one deals with that which is beyond im-
mediate knowledge, he necessarily engages in speculation. This
is true of Calhoun as he establishes his belief in God and
formulates his concept of God's character. The world of fact
is ours by practical considerations; it is explained theoreti-
cally. In attempting an explanation Calhoun's methods are
analogy, analysis, and synthesis. His use of these becomes
114. Calhoun, GCL, 1. Regardless of interest any idea
of God is necessarily speculative. Prom this section on, the
author is assumed to be Calhoun unless otherwise stated.

clear as he states:
It (analogy] involves the concrete conscious use
of one vividly realized part of experience to
illuminate another, ... Analysis and synthesis
... , less artistic and more critical procedures;
the one employed to purge out . . . such irrelevant
and incongruous factors ... ; the other -- synthe-
sis -- employed to amplify the picture in syste-
matic, coherent fashion, ...(115)
To summarize: Calhoun finds by a practical examination
of man a world of facts which is best explained by the concept
of God. As this world of fact reveals God, then it is theoreti-
cally sound to interpret his being according to the nature of
these facts. Vividly realized experiences illuminate the idea
of God, such illumination guided by analysis and synthesis.
FIELD OF INVESTIGATION
General field: Everyday human behavior and its total objective
setting.
To be valid the method of analogy must start with a
factual field from which analogies can be drawn. Investigation
of the unknown must start from a basis in the known. Calhoun
finds this known field to be human experience. But not all
human experience is understandable. There are many divergent
views on common experiences. Just where then, asks Calhoun,
shall one begin? We can't let the experts chart our course,
for the experts are having their own difficulties. "The stars
covered, the horizon obscured, where now shall we find a base
115. GCL, 179.

line from which to reckon?" (116)
Calhoun considers the minds of men, but finds that they
diverge widely; nature, but nature says so little regarding the
values v/hich vitally concern us; God, but God is today nothing
more than a well-meant anachronism. He concludes that the base
line should be everyday human behavior in its total objective
setting. (117) This, above all, is plain fact. Human behavior
is common experience as men live day by day in a common life.
Calhoun's starting point is thus common ground to all.
Specific starting point ; The day's work as vocation.
Within the general field the most common starting
point must be found. Calhoun finds that to seek in the every-
day life of plain people for intimations of God should suggest
at once beginning with the day's work and the yearly round.
"For it was there primarily," says Calhoun, "that among much
simpler folk religion was grounded.
" (118) So his discussion
begins with a consideration of the day's work as vocation. To
do needful work, then; to lose oneself and find oneself therein;
to participate thus in a common task and a shared life: this,
and the summons to it, we shall mean by vocation. In vocation
Calhoun finds the base and root for the religion of the rank
and file. (119)
116. GCL, 179.
117. Ibid., vlii
118. Ibid., 12.
119. Ibid., 74.
i

CLASSIFICATION OF ARGUMENT
Calhoun professes to be presenting what he calls
Religious Realism, following the more general approach of that
school known as Critical Realism. This self-classification
reveals his general philosophical position, but tells little
about the nature of his argument for God. v.ieman and Meland
classify Calhoun's approach as that of an evolutionary theist
with roots in naturalism. (120) Their classification is based
upon the field from which Calhoun draws his facts which eventu-
ate in belief in God.
Further classification in regard to this specific argu-
ment is possible from a consideration of these facts. They are
drawn from the physical universe as the common man sees it.
This justifies calling him an evolutionary theist, for the major
fact revealed by the universe is the gradual emergence of higher
forms, the highest of which is man. But these facts reveal a
purpose which cannot be attributed to man and which has not
simply been read into them. Calhoun thus stresses the teleolog-
ical nature of the universe. And it is this fact which makes it
reasonable for him to conclude that the power behind the world
is a Sovereign Mind. The nature of the considerations of this
argument mark it as an expression of the physico-teleological
form.
As man is the highest expression of the evolutionary
process, it is he who furnishes clues to the nature of reality.
120. Wieman and Meland, APR, 221 f
.
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The common activity of man is work, vocation. And investigation
therein is, for Calhoun, the logical starting point. Calhoun's
consideration of the evolutionary process is the basis of his
argument for God; theorizing about vocation is the basis for his
concept of the character of God.
ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE
To reason about God as existing in actuality,
and not merely in idea or in experience, one must
argue from actually observed consequent to suf-
ficient ground. (121)
In other words the common life of observable fact as interpreted
by reason furnishes the starting point. This life furnishes us
facts for which sufficient ground is found in the concept of
God as Sovereign Mind. A survey makes his position more coher-
ent .
Beginning the construction of the world picture by
considering human experience in its total objective setting and
finding therein the day's work of specific importance, Calhoun
comes upon active minds. That brings up the question of minds
and their place in the world. In considering this question,
Calhoun builds a world picture of observed consequents.
The actual observed consequents are: (a) the unfin-
ished universe consisting of physical events, living organisms,
minds, and forms or pure possibilities in which we observe
characteristic marks of organization without complete fixity,
and intricate order maintained in and throughout fluent variety;
121. GCL, 145.

and (b) man as emergent, animal world-child, critic, creator,
worshiper, and clue to the nature of the universe.
'The unfinished uni vers e
.
The phrase "an unfinished universe" brings up two
J
ideas: phenomenal flux; and order, pattern, or law. These are
so exemplified in the universe that it seems at the some time to
be perpetual incompleteness and partly ordered becoming. (122)
Jin physical events we find fluidity as well as rigidity. In
it
the physical world we see marks of organization, of intricate
order in fluent varietv. (123)
Turning to the order of living things Calhoun finds the
I)
[j
same problems in increased complexity.
A living organism, to repeat a phrase used
earlier, is a complex whirlpool in which detailed
content perpetually changes, yet approximately
stable patterns persist. (124)
A mammal in its anatomical organization is uiified or integrated
in at least four important ways: by a jointed skeletal system;
b circulatory system; a neural system; and an enclosing envelope
of skin and other surface membranes. An organism unified ana-
1tornicaliv exhibits corresponding unification in its more fluid
and shifting behavior: metabolism, in which is found the pro-
longed maintenance of characteristic form; reproduction; and in
function of that called mind. Asking how such stable fluidities
122. GCL, 148.
123. Ibid., 159.

as the more complex organisms were produced, the answer given
is: by evolution from simpler organisms. But that, in the end,
is to say that for the production of adantive organisms, adaptive
organisms are required, "Emergent evolution" is merely the re-
statement of the oroblem, not the solution.
Confronting the flux of m'nds and their activities they
are found to be at once products in some sense and participants
in the evolutionary process
.
(125) .hen living organisms appear
and follow the phenomena of differentiation and integration,
m'nds emerge and develop. Minds develop not in isolation but in
social contexts and these also have their place among the pro-
ducts of evolution. Man*s social organizations as well as man
as an individual disolays more complex variability in behavior
than other living organisms. Here the line is crossed from bi-
ology into history, and again the inadequacy of the term "evo-
lution" is apparent.
So minds, able to think, to learn, to build, to destroy
and build again, emerge somehow, ''and it is they that now pour
scorn upon themselves and their achievements. " (126) But that
does not undo the world that brought human minds to birth. Con-
cluding Calhoun says:
125. GCL, 139.
126. Ibid., 143.

The answer which seems to me least incredible of
the answers so far proposed is the familiar
one which Plato wrote into the Sophist, the
Philebus, and the last book of "the Law's : That
Mind ,In significant measure such as'we have
sought to describe is among the first principles
of the universe; not merely a product of evolu-
tion but one of its primary grounds. (127)
Calhoun now turns from the actual world to an elusive
realm of oossibilities, "which are never, as such, actual and
which seem not likely ever to be completely exemplified in act-
ual events, things, or persons." (1. 8) Form or pure possibil-
ity, he finds, is in short:
every verbal or other symbolic expression /hose
meanin^ is anything else than a particular event,
thing, person, or other actual entity as particular"
and actual. (129)
f With formal possibilities are numbered also- ideals
or unactualized values. The distinctive note of ideals is their
<
claim to represent various asoects of the good as ultimate goal
II
of thougnt and action, thereby serving as criteria for both
these aspects of behavior. But here enters the inescapable
human equation which is an ever-present source of probable er-
ror. (130)
127. GCL, 144.
128. Ibid., 165.
129. Ibid., 166,
!!
130. Ibid., 168.

Man.
Coming upon man as an animal engs e~ed in mental be-
I havior by following the line of actual events through physical
!
and organic processes, and -gain by following the lines of in-
I terconnectedness among forms, or structural and ide 1 essences,
I he is present as an unideal and disturbing participant. As a
product of the world processes man is an animal, a world-child.
II (131) "He is a bodv-mind hierarchy in which each of the main
it
,i sorts of processes we have discussed is to be found." (132)
At all these levels he is intimately interrelated with the act-
; ual world of nature. At the same time, "man who is animal and
[I
'! world-child is also critic, cre^ tor, and worshiper." (133)
These roles can be fulfilled only by one who in some degree
[I
stands clear of his immediate environment and reacts upon it au-
! tonomouslv. Critical judgment is the primary function of these
jl
!; three. It involves the partial emancipation from the immediate
;i present that is basic to all behavior. Mental behavior may be
jl
:, regarded as the medium for the directed and purposeful actualiz-
ing of imaginatively apprehended possibilities and values. (134)
| Man can turn this capacity for critical judgment upon himself
i and his work. Often he finds himself and his work inadequate.
131. GCL, 169.
132. Loc. cit.
133. Ibid., 170.
134. Ibid., 171.
i

Man's comparison of self with some greater good is frequently
a primary factor in the complex experience of worship.
In a wider consideration of this last statement,
11
Calhoun finds that man must be brought into just perspective
as the most directly accessible clue to the universe, and the
one with which every speculative theory must set out. (135)
To gain through man insight into the nature of reality, it
i
mm
is necessary to combine the detailed insights and information
ij
accumulated through the process of learni 1 g and the sagacity
of a mind open to all that is significant in each situa-
tion. (136)
Sufficient ground.
i
These several observable facts comprise for Calhoun
the world-picture. The problem now is to find an explanation
that offers sufficient ground for the observed consequents.
In considering this picture of an unfinished world, showing
some of characteristics of organization without comolete
ii
fixity and of intricate order in and through fluent variety,
f!
he says:
Our concern as theologians here is two-fold: to
enquire on what terms, if at all, this total world-
picture may be held together in such fashion as not
to violate our sober judgment as to what seems rea-
sonable; and to discover whether in such n inquiry,
there may come to light reenforcement for belief in,
135. GCL. 172.
136. Ibid., 173.

and ways of thinking about a Being at once real
enough, great enough, and good enou h to be call ed
God. (137)
In attempting this Calhoun considers the four live
hypotheses which are offered to explain the array of facts in
the world-picture: chance combination; natural law; guidance
by some unconscious but rtua si-purposive force; and Mind, He
finds Mind the most rational explanation of the world-picture.
The bewildering array of facts found in the world are unex-
plainable by any irrational factor. There is in the world-
picture intelligible order which has not been read into it and
which cannot be accounted for as the outcome of knovvn non-men-
tal processes. Following Leibniz he finds the world as per-
ceDtible and intelligible, perceptibility and Intelligibility
necessitate the existence and actlvit of a Being sufficient
to account for t eir presence. A Being sufficient in explan-
ation is found in the concept of God as Sovereign Mind.
Thus by a consideration of man's world which reveals
intelligible order not read into it and which cannot be ac-
counted for as the outcome of non-mental processes, Calhoun
concludes that the sufficient ground for explanation lies in
the concept of God,
137. GCL. 174

CRITICISM OP THE PHYSICO-TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
This line of argument is but a minor part of an appeal
presented by the author. The main concern of his book is an
appeal for the religious motive to dominate in the everday com-
mon life of man. It justifies this appeal ( the argument is
found in this justification ) and proceeds to point the way to
sufch a life. It is an admirable point and an emphasis greatly
needed. Religion is too often merely "Sunday religion." If
there be any truth in religious belief, the divorce of religion
from the common life has no justifiable ground. But this em-
phasis is not up for consideration. Expressed purposes limit
this study to a critical evaluation of Calhoun's argument for
God.
There is much that is valid in this argument as Calhoun
presents it. Conviction of the actuality of God is established
by the rationality of the universe, the emergence of novelties
in the evolutionary process, and the fact of personality.
Though these facts by no means exhaust the many evidences for
^od, they are of the most significant. And these are found in
Calhoun's line of argument. His entire consideration of the
universe reveals rationality, puroose, and evidence of mind at
work. The emsrgence of novelties is accounted for, in the most
rational way, by belief in God. And man, the highest expression
of the universe, leads to God. For these reasons the argument
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jj is acceptable. |
But to present this argument as the only line of ev-
idence for belief in God is not exhaustive. Doubtless Calhoun's
jj
purposes limit him to a presentation of those which are the
H
most convincing to his own thinking. In general, there is much
objection to a method which seeks objectivity for a religious
ji faith and wholly neglects that faith. Calhoun establishes his
belief upon considerations which do not deal directly with that
^belief. Such procedure is not to be wholly condemned. The
I point is that it is difficult to understand why the author ne-
glected the very thing he was seeking to justifv. Has religion
'no validity of its own? Can it not itself reveal processes whiclt
establish its objectivity? It is true that the common man is
jj
seemingly the result of purposeful forces, but what about those
;| purposeful forces which are immanent in his being? Calhoun falli
..
1
short, at least of thoroughness, in his consideration of the
common life.
Wieman and Meland classify Calhoun's approach to God as
a brilliant contribution to his group. (138) They refer to the
idea that belief in God comes from deeper levels, ;,from something
j| that is deeper than thinking. "( 154) But neither they nor Calhoun
gives us any hint as to what this something is. Of what use is
138. Wieman and Meland, APR, 221.
139. Loc. cit.

this mysterious approach? Any approach must be present to the
conscious life of man, otherwise it is of no significance. And
present to the conscious life of man means ore sent to the thought
of man. Our very nature makes thought the includer of all.
Calhoun makes no use of this approach in his work.
CALHOUN'S CONCEPT OF THE CHARACTER OP GOD
The outcome of his considerations leads Calhoun to con-
clude that God is "Creator-Redeemer: Living Mind at work. "(140)
How can a Living Mind at work be thought of? As men is the
highest expression of God's purposes, we can survey his activity
as living mind and reasonably assume that God acts in some anal-
agous manner.
Analogy.
Calhoun draws his analogy from his own life, from its
relations with his own life experience. He considers not merely
his body but his whole career. Every event that is a part of
his life in every moment, day, or year, that he lives. He is
the sensitive core of his living^ yet not merely che core of it.
He permeates it all and reaches beyond it in all sorts of ways.
He influences things and people and is influenced by them. He
considers distant ends as well as the present. His self is
nourished among other selves, things, and happenings. His life
140. GCL, 178.

is a field of force patterned, active, influencing, and influ-
enced by things and other such fields of force. Lining is never
well done, but always incomplete and faulty. Ignorance, laziness,
and cowardice keep one from doing all that he can. There are
conditions given over which man has little or no control. (141)
But some form of good emerges for all that, and one finds him-
self in the midst of it. With this characterization of the ac-
tivity of human m'nd, let us see how the mind of God can function
in an analogous manner.
Omniscience.
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Now suppose, says Calhoun, the inclusive field of space-
time to be the whole vehicle of one Mind. A field in which Mind
is present and operative everywhere at many diverse levels. How
can one think of such Mind as resident through, active within,
and transcendent beyond the space-time order? Starting with anal
ogy and proceeding by way of critical analysis and synthesis,
Calhoun enters the speculative realm which deals with his work-
ing conviction that God is Sovereign Mind. (142)
Considering God as Omniscient Knower, Calhoun finds re-
strictions of at least four sorts that beset human minds but do
not apply to God. (143) First, limitations that hamper everyone
141. Analogy from this point could find a "given" in God%
being. This suggests a finite God.
142. GCL, 183.
143. Loc. cit.
±!
who is bound to a particular location. For human observers there
is a fixed time cone which delimits the entire range of events,
past, present, and future. This does not hold concerning God.
If he is omnipresent throughout the world, no events transpiring
within the world are hidden from Him. (144)
Second, those limitations imposed upon finite man by his
sense organs. Sensory knowledge of the outside world is frag-
mentary. Man receives sensory stimulations of light, sound,
color, and smell from objects external to him. But God is not
dependent upon such confining sensory organs. To an omnipresent
God those objects which are external to man are internal to Him.
"The very field in which the events transpired would itself be
for God, a 'boundless uniform sensorium 1 or vehicle for im-
mediate apprehension of such events.
" ( 145)
Third, God has an infinite time- span of apprehension as
regards all events which have transpired. (146) Human minds re-
tain somehow the impressions of past events, taking them up into
habit patterns. But the real time- span man can conclude in a
single pulse of awareness, the specious present, is very meagre.
He can at times, by intense concentration or by using signs to
144. GCL, 183.
145. Ibid,, 184.
146. Calhoun's concept of the time-span is like Royce '
s
except that it does not include rhe future. Cf. WI(2), 132.
--
•
t
stand for huge aggregates, increase the range of his specious
present. But man can by no means grasp in a moment the /hole con-f
crete coherence of things past. But God can do just that. God
has before Him in a single infinite time- span all the events whiciji
have come to be and are coming to be. (147) In this way Calhoun
affirms the eternality of God.
When we spoke of His freedom from limitation in
space- time, we affirmed His omnipresence. 1 hen
we speak now of His apprehension as encompassing
all that has transpired and is transpiring in an
infinite time-span, .ve affirm His eternality. (1- 8)
Fourth, the omnipresence and eternality of God in respecl:
to events past and present implies not merely presence in and con-|
tinuous through, but transcendence beyond all the t has yet come
to be. Events transpire for God but He sees more than the events
and their forms. "He sees also all the great families of timeles^
forms in their main trunks and branches. ''( 149) These ramify out
endlessly beyond all that has been, is, and will be, through all
that may or might be, and the implications of all of these. But
to say that God is conscious of all this endless infinite, or tha
it is within Himself, is meaningless. The multitude of forms is
not completely manageable by mind. (150) God, however, is deter-
147. If God has all before Him in a single infinite time«
span, and the time- span be within the mind of God, is not his
realistic position difficult? This interpretation implies that
jail reality is of the nature of mind, idealistic.
148. GCL, 186.
149. Ibid., 187.
150. This also suggests a finite God.
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minate in His nature not indefinite, 30 He has present in His
Being a vast range of possibilities not yet expressed in what
has come to pass, including many that will never be so exempli-
fied. And He is conscious of such possibilities from moment to
moment of real duration. Therefore, for God there would be no
learning by trial and error, nor being forced to consider unfore
seen and startling events, not because He has access through His
own transcendent nature to the forms of all and at every point
the forms that are the most revelant, God is Himself the dom-
inant power in bringing events to pass. (151) For these reasons
Calhoun holds God*s knowing to be incompatible with man's in at
least four ways. Hence he thinks of God as omniscient.
There are two resnects in which there are limitations
of God's knowing, analogous to man's. First, if He is deter-
minate in nature, not indefinite or all-inclusive, it will mean,
as regards knowing, that He is a Subject occupying a distinct
cognitive point of view. Second, God cannot know in full what
has not come to pass.
Actual happening, the fact of coming to be, makes a
difference for God, the same as that fact for man makes a diff-
erence in the manner in v/nich a thing can be known. If the
stream of events be indeterminate then foreknowledge is not at
any point complete. (152)
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Calhoun finds that neither of these limitations in-
volves any deficiency in God, Omnioresent throughout the world,
J
though not of it nor encompassed within it, God is everywhere
near. Every physical event that transpires is in principle
knowable by Him, but not all receive His attention, "A definite
cognitive point of view implies selection among data which in
princinle are all knowable •"( 153)
: Omnipotence
.
Considering next God's omnipotence as Doer he states:
The same two general characters of o .Jiipresence
and eternality, or sovereignty with respect to
space- time and real duration or world process,
which so widely differentiate His knowing from
ours, are basic also in His doing. (154)
i
Basing God's omnipotence as Doer on analogy to human work he re-
!]
cognizes that Divine Mind is unhampered by certain of our dis-
abilities, namely, ignorance, inner conflict, restrictions in
space-time, and inferiority to particular finite sources. Ig-
norance and restrictions in space-time are excluded if God is
omniscient. He is free from inner conflict for He has full
vision at every juncture of what is good. His natural pred-
ilection is fully determined toward the good, which is His per-
manent goal.
153. GCL, 189.
154. Loc. cit.

However Calhoun does not go so far as to ascribe ab-
solute omnipotence to God, He believes God's power limited.
First, by His own nature, God is Perfect Spirit and perfection
necessarily involves limitation. As the characters of wisdom,
justice, and mercy limit one another, so is God's power limited
as His nature involves these characters. God must be true to
Himself. There are things which He cannot do because He is God.
This reciprocal limitation of one divine character-
istic by another is what ma- be better maintained,
I think, than what is often called the "self-limi-
tation" of God. (155)
In tnis view of Divine limitation Calhoun finds God limited not
by quasi-artificial restraints voluntarily imposed upon Himself,
but by the intrinsic nature of His Being, which cannot act other-
wise than toward the fullest possible realization of good.
Second, God's power as Doer may be thought of as limited
by various factors not within Himself • (156) Calhoun calls these
rigidities. They are not to be regarded as evil. They contri-
bute in some way to productive work. The hindrances they impose
bring about evil as .veil as good. (157) Among these factors call-
ed rigidities are: certain forms or characters incompatible with
certain others; a class intrinsic to various modes of extension,
in space or time or both; and a class called by the name, inertia
the tendency to follow the line of least resistance. These con-
155. GCL, 193. With this I must agree.
156. There is a similarity here with Brightman's theory
of "The Given" in God. Cf . PG and FG.
=4k 157. The existence of these rigidities is not explained.

79
tribute conditions for productive work, and through them and
their help minds are able to effect results that are good.
Yet by them also, in diverse ways, its work is
hampered and its results vitiated. For God as
veil as for men, I judge that such hindrances
have to be overcome, and that at no actual junc-
ture in the n'orld-process are they completely
eliminated, (158)
Third, in considering rigidities of the second and third
sorts named, Calhoun finds the factor of flux in the behavior of
all concrete things. If flux involves real contigency or in-
determinacy then it constitutes another limitation upon God's
power. No event is rigorously determined until it has transpired
For Calhoun this reveals "God, and with God chance and contigen-
cy," (159) Fourth, contingent upon the view of indeterminacy,
finite persons may be regarded as able to oppose their wills and
energies to one another and to God,
i
Thus by analogy Calhoun reveals God to be: a) Omnis-
cient Knower, which characteristic involves omnipresence, eter-
nal! ty, transcendence, and limitation; and b) Omnipotent Doer,
'limited by His own nature, by various factors within Himself, by
indeterminacy in concrete things, and by finite persons.
Ethical.
For Calhoun the goodness of God admits no proof. He
affirms this attribute of God, but offers no justification for
158. GCL, 194.
159, Ibid., 195. Calhoun, more so than Royce, makes
possible a satisfying concept of finite freedom.
a

this conclusion. For him as with Plato, 'God is good, and the
author only of good to men. 1 (160) And this he finds is the crux
of religious faith.
The world is great: that needs no proof. In
it the sovereign power is good: this admits
no proof. But to affirm it with all one's
heart and mind is to "believe in God, great be-
yond our conceiving, yet not too great to be
good. (161)
160. GCL, 190.
lolo Loc. cit.
•• c •
CRITICISM OP CALHOUN'S CONCEPT OF THE
CHARACTER OF GOD.
Criticism of Calhoun from the standpoint of our purposes
is hardly fair to his purposes. Yet the contribution he makes
to our problem as we have extracted it from his work is basic
to the main emphasis of his book. Our negative criticisms
concern, that which he fails to mention. There are times when
it appears that Calhoun deals in conclusions and beliefs ra-
ther than in the justification of points of view. There is
much that a thorough treatment of this problem would bring in.
For example; more than one line of argument for God is neces-
sary, a more exhaustive consideration of the ethical nature of
God would have contributed much, and the consistent treatment
of the concept of God deals with the problem of evil.
Though Calhoun recognizes the significance of man
and from him builds his concept of God by analogy, he neglects
the most important fact of this highest revelation, his person-
ality. In sucn an emphasis on the worth of man, one feels
that such neglect is Durposive. What more consistent conclu-
sion could result from any analogy from man than that there be
a Supreme Person?
Calhoun's treatment of the ethical nature of God is
unsatisfying. Too much room for doubt is possible. It would
seem that an expression of the physico-teleological argument

would find much evidence of good in the w rid. And from that
evidence conclude that God is good. But Calhoun fails to
stress even this point. His treatment seems to be but a state-
ment of his belief. For his own thinking that perhaps is ad-
equate, but for the inquiring reader, wholly unconvincing. If
God is not good, there is little value or need in searching or
believing. Perhaps the point, is o voided because of the sub-
sequent necessity of explaining evil. And Calhoun did not pur-
pose to enter into the technical realm more than was necessary
Calhoun offers us a finite God. On the whole, this
conceot of God appears to be the most satisfying and consis-
tent. That Calhoun offers a finite God is evident in his lim-
itations of God's omniscience and omnipotence. His concept of
rigidities is evidence for his belief in a finite God. He goes
beyond traditional thought in making this original contribution.
But these ripidities are not within God's being. And here
Calhoun is to be criticised, there is reason for conceiving
these as existent apart from God. To do so results in a fun-
damental dualism which is untenable.
Despite the inadequacy at points in his treatment,
there is much that is acceptable. His concepts of limitations
to Divine omniscience and omnipotence make possible a concept
of finite freedom compatible with our direct experience of it.
His concept of Divine limitation makes possible a consistent
explanation of evil as we experience it. His treatment of
omniscience and omnipotence presents no contradictions when

considering the goodness of God, His treatment of eterna Lity
does not permit foreknowledge, thus avoiding conflict between
omniscience and omnipotence, and again aiding a consistent
concept of finite freedom. In general, it may be said that
Calhoun escapes many difficulties which Royce does not, Cal-
houn offers a conception closer to the empirical facts.
Calhoun also insists upon the absolute otherness of
finite persons, and with his position it is possible. This is
not the case in Royce' s system. Though he insists upon the
"otherness of selves," they find their completion in the one
true Self, It is difficult to understand how "otherness" is
possible in Royce 1 s system.

CHAPTER IV
ROYCE VS. CALHOUN
Having comoleted our investigations, it is now time
to compare these two men. Comparison is made not merely to
show the superiority of one to the other, but to illustrate
the differences between one of the greatest American philoso-
phers of religion who followed the idei listic tradition nnd
one of our contemporaries of the opposing trend of realism.
Probably the first difference, already mentioned,
is that of their basic approach. Royce is the idealist; Cal-
houn the realist. These bases direct each to particular as-
pects of the field of experience. Royce in his maa y works ex-
amines the realistic position and finds it inadequate. Cal-
houn in his work finds no place for a consideration of the
idealistic position.
Comparison of Arguments for God.
Royce »s contributions to this problem are more thor-
ough and systematic. Granting him his premises, his completed
concept is consistent within itself. Calhoun, however, seems
to deal in conclusions. His concepts ore not established so
much by argument as by statement. While with Royce, the es-
tablishing of his points carries him through a detailed inves-
tigation which results in his conclusion.

Both men ground their investigation in an empirical
basis. Their difference consists in that the-; consider differ-
ent aspects of this basis with different methods. Royce'
s
inquiry leads him into a consideration of ideas which is in
line with his idealistic approach. Calhoun begins his inquiry
by an investigation of finite work. This reflects his realis-
tic premises. The realist would perhaps claim that Royce falls
prey to the "egocentric predicament." If man is in the egocen-
tric predicament, he cannot discount it, rather he must make
the most of it. And this is the attempt that Royce makes.
The spirit evidenced by both men is a deeply reli-
gious one. To both religion is real and dynamic. It is the
normal state of man's living. In application they make reli-
gion -the central factor, Royce in his concept of the Beloved
Community and Calhoun in his Christian doctrine of Vocation,
Calhoun* s primary interest is not so much in proving
G-od's existence as it is the interpretation of His nature and
our relations to Him. Royce, however, continually seeks to
prove God's existence, perhaps as much for his own certainty
as for that of his reader. Consequently his works cover the
entire religious field in a systematic way. His belief in God
is established by argument and the resultant concept of God is
worked out in detail. The attributes of God are the logical
outcome of his argument. Thus every concept is an advance
over a previous one, but the new is always consistent v/ith the
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old, Calhoun does not present his contributions in similar
fashion. It is often difficult to follow his establishment of
divine attributes. His argument for the existence of C-od has
no logical connection with his argument for Divine char-' c-
ter, (162) So again it can be said that Royce is the more
consistent and systematic, and the thorough nature of his work
on this problem and in the philosophy of religion make it a
more valuable contribution to the field.
The methods used by each in his arguments differ
considerably, Royce is primarily the rationalistic empiricist,
Calhoun the naturalist. Royce is the theoretical philosopher,
while Calhoun is primarily the practical. Royce proceeds
from accepted fact and reasons his way to a concept of the
whole. His particular concept is made necessary because of the
implications arising from the facts. Calhoun, not interested
so much in theory, seeks a concept that the common man can
understand and live by.
Comparison of concepts of the character of God,
Royce ' s concept of God is best summed up by the term,
"Absolute," and Calhoun's by the term, Finite." "Absolute' in
that God is all thought and all experience, "Finite" in that
God is limited by factors within and without. Considering
these concepts in relation to the foundational arguments,
162. However this is no criticism of his argument or
of his concept of God. The final teat In each case is coherenq

Royce's entire work is much more systematic and thorough. For
him the concept of God's character is the logical outcome of his
argument. Alteration of the argument would affect the result-
ant concept. In Calhoun's work this is not the case. His con-
cept of God's character has no direct connection with the ar-
- ent. Each stands on its own merits.
For both Royce and Calhoun the most important attribute
is that of omniscience. Royce defines this attribute in terms
of Absolute Thought and Absolute Experience. Establishment is
the direct result of his consideration of ideas. Calhoun de-
fines omniscience in terms of omnipresence and eternality. God
is resident through, active within, transcendent beyond the
space- time order, and apprehends all that has transpired and
is transpiring in an infinite time- span. This concept of omnis-
cience has no direct connection with ^alhoun's argument for God.
Invalidation of the argument would have little effect on the
attribute of omniscience.
Relative to the attribute of eternality, both men have
much in common. Their greatest difference lies in that Royce
includes all that was, is, and will be in the experience of God,
while Calhoun includes only all tht was and is. Here, as with
the attribute of omniscience, Royce's concept of eternality is
the outcome of basic premises while Calhoun's is not.

Both men agree that God is morally good, Calhoim makes
this attribute a conclusion which admits of no proof. Royce
finds that God is good because God must know what is desirable,
and knowing it, must have present in himself the true objects
of desire. Royce 1 s contribution on this attribute is by far the
more profound.
Calhoun considers specifically the omnipotence of God.
He finds God limited by factors within His being and without His
being. Calhoun's concept is a concept of a finite God. Royce
does not consider omnipotence, but the idea is present in his
establishment of omniscience. For Royce God is Absolute Thought,
Absolute Experience, and Absolute Will* All that the traditional
attribute of omnipotence implies is found in the Roycean concept
of God.
The more thorough work of Royce is evident in his fur-
ther contribution along this line. In addition to the foremen-
tioned character traits, which for Calhoun completes his concept,
Royce considers unity, will, love, and personality.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary.
Following the problem of this thesis into the philos-
ophy of Josiah Royce, four arguments for the existence of God
were found, the Epistemological argument, the argument from Per-
sonality, the argument from the Possibility of Error, and the
Moral argument • The Epistemological argument began with the
fact of idea and found there an internal and external meaning.
Investigation showed the logical priority of the internal. In
fact it appeared to be the sole determiner of the idea. But the
objective world exerts its influence. It exists, and the idea
refers to it. The problem became, how can an idea, determined
by its own purnose, refer to an object and be true? The only
consistent explanation was to conclude that there is an All-In-
clusive Being who contains both the idea and the object. This
argument was found confusing and at points neglecting essential
facts in its considerations.
The argument from personality began with the consider-
ation of the finite self. Individual selves were wholly unable
to state just what they were. They found themselves very frag-
mentary. To be the self they are, they must be more than they
appear to be. To be the selves they are it was found that they

must be a part of the true and complete Self, God. This argu-
ment was found neglecting essential facts and the real force of
personality.
The argument from the possibility of Error inquired in-
to the logical conditions necessary for error. It concluded
that for error to be oossible the knower and object known must
be included in a third being, God. This argument was found more
acceptable than the previous two. Here is a powerful theoreti-
cal argument for the existence of a supreme being.
The Moral argument sought to establish the objectivity
of moral values. This Royce did in terms of his concept of loy-
alty. This argument was given additional force by a considera-
tion of the possibility of error. This was found to be Royce'
s
most consistent and forceful argument for God.
Concluding the investigation of his arguments, Royce'
concept of God's character was considered next. He presented
God as Absolute Thought, Absolute Experience, Absolute Unity,
Absolute Will, Absolute Love, Morally good, Eternal, and Per-
sonal. His conceDt was found to contain much that was accept-
able and much that was not.
Taking up the problem in the philosonhy of Robert L.
Calhoun, we found in his work an expression of the physico-teleo
logical argument. Calhoun found purpose at work in natural pro-
cesses and in the gradual emergence of man. These purposive
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processes were found to reveal mind at work. The only expla-
nation of ohese meanings was to conclude that they were the work
of a Sovereign Mind. Though this argument did not rise to the
theoretical height of the Roycean arguments, its conclusion was
found justifiable. Calhoun's method is more apt to be the way
the common man finds his way to God.
Calhoun established his concept of the character of God
by analogy to the limited abilities of man. He portrayed God as
omniscient, omnipresent, eternal, omniootent, moral, transcen-
dent, and limited. Though these attributes are not the direct
outcome of his argument for God, they are closely related and
consistent with his conclusion.
Comparing these two men ;md their work on this problem,
Royce was found the more theoretical, consistent, and syste-
matic. (163) His many works reveal a profound and systematic
in iuiry into the nature of reality. Calhoun was not so con-
cerned with the proof of God. He was more interested in defin-
ing God and His relations to man.
Conclusions.
Royce, in following Plato's way of idea, pursues the
most fruitful pa h towards understanding reality. However, the
0
conclusions resulting from his analysis of ideas do not merit
the logical necessity he claims for them.
163. Consistent within his own system.

Royce ' s arguments result in eoistemological monism and
his concept of God in metaphysical monism. These conclusions
are not impossible, but they raise many difficult problems
which Royce does not solve to the satisfaction of experience,
Royce offers a unique approach to the objectivity of
v 'lues in his argument from the possibility of error. His use
of this argument to substantiate the moral argument gives a
profound throretical argument for the existence of God.
Calhoun, though not the equal of Royce, offers an ac-
ceptable argument for God, though his exposition of it be in-
adequate. And his concept of God, though lacking completeness
and theoretical justification, is in the main consistent with
finite experience.
Both men reveal a deeply religious character and de-
votion to an ideal. Though neither offers final solution to
the problem of God, both have made significant contributions.
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